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INTRODUCTION
Federal-state relations in the area of water law were historically
characterized by federal deference to state water allocation systems
However, this has undergone a dramatic reversal in recent years, a fact
nowhere more evident than in federal agencies' efforts to secure instream flows for various federal purposes. The result has been frustration and mistrust on all sides, negotiation and litigation that have
I Wendy Weiss is the First Assistant Attorney General for the Federal and Interstate Water Unit of the Colorado Attorney General's Office. She wishes to express her
appreciation to the Attorney General's Office for its support in preparing this paper,
but to note that she is solely responsible for content and opinions expressed herein.

1. The history of federal water policy is surveyed in California v. United States, 438

U.S. 645 (1978). See also United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume I

reached almost epic proportions, and a surfeit of over-the-top rhetoric. The federal government and environmentalists accuse the states
and traditional water users of inflexibility in the face of changing social
values, while the states and water users feel betrayed and indignant at
having their settled expectations upset and their large investments
placed at risk.
Two developments in the law converged to create the current
situation. First, in 1952, Congress enacted the McCarran Amendment, 2 which waived the United States' sovereign immunity and consented to its joinder in state water adjudications. As a result, federal
agencies began (albeit reluctantly) to assert water right claims in state
courts during the 1970s. Because the federal government's prior failure to participate in state adjudications was privileged, its water rights
were entitled to receive their true priorities, even when that meant antedating priorities awarded in earlier adjudications! This allowed the4
United States to cut in line ahead of previously decreed water rights.
Not surprisingly, the owners of 1?reviously decreed water rights vigorously opposed the federal claims.
The second development was heightened legal recognition of environmental values in the 1960s and 197 0s. Besides passing landmark
environmental legislation,6 Congress changed the missions of existing
federal agencies to incorporate these environmental values.7 Consequently, federal agencies with an often new found interest in instream
flows for purposes such as fish and wildlife habitat, recreation, and aesthetics began asserting claims for instream flow water rights8 in state

2. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
3. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d
631 (Colo. 1986); United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).
4. Bel, 724 P.2d at 640-45 (discussing the relationship between antedation and
Colorado's postponement doctrine). See also Navajo Development Co. v. Sanderson,
655 P.2d 1374 (Colo. 1982).
5. The United States' claims in the consolidated cases reviewed in Denver originally drew objections from 169 parties, represented by at least seventy different attorneys. Denver, 656 P.2d at 11. See also Bell 724 P.2d at 634 n.4 (sixty-six statements of
opposition filed).
6. E.g., National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1994 & Supp. 1 1995); Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994 & Supp. I
1995); Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
7. E.g., Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yi'eld Act (MUSYA) of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528
(1994); Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701
(1994 & Supp. 11995).
8. The term "instream flow water right" refers to a right to maintain flows in a
given stream reach without a diversion or other means of control (such as a hydropower plant). See City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 931 (Colo.
1992) ("A minimum stream flow does not require removal or control of water by some
structure or device. A minimum stream flow between two points on a stream or river
usually signifies the complete absence of a structure or device."); Board of County
Comm'rs of Arapahoe County v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 838
P.2d 840, 854 (Colo. 1992) (storage in a reservoir for subsequent instream uses not an
instream flow right). This article will also use the term as a shorthand for rights to
maintain natural lake levels or volumes.
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proceedings.' Aside from the antedation issue, these claims were particularly sensitive because a diversion has historically been an essential
element of a water right in the western states, and an instream flow
right by its very nature lacks a diversion." Although many states now
recognize instream flow rights," they generally exercise control over
their creation out of concern that 2freely granting such rights could
preclude future water development.
As noted, the federal government's instream flow claims were often
hotly contested. The Forest Service was particularly unsuccessful in
the courts" and began relying on its permitting authority to force
holders of state water rights with facilities in the national forests to relinquish a portion of their rights for instream flows.14 This only escalated the conflict. Faced with seemingly endless political and legal battles, federal agencies, state agencies, water users, and environmental
groups are exploring new ways to integrate federal instream flow uses
into state legal systems.
This article discusses the United States' efforts to adjudicate reserved and appropriative instream flow water rights, the use of federal
regulatory authority to maintain instream flows absent federal water
rights, and negotiated efforts to satisfy federal instream flow demands
within state law. Due to both my own experience and the fact that
Colorado has often been at the center of the controversy, this article
focuses on Colorado's experience.

9. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); United States v.
Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).
10. See discussion of appropriative instream flow rights infra pp. 167-71.
11. See Cynthia F. Covell, A Survey of State Instream Flow Programs in the Western United
States, 1 U. DENy. WATERL. REV. 177 (1998).
12. One commentator advocating state recognition of private instream flow rights
has argued that if the diversion requirement were eliminated, there would be no principled basis for distinguishing between appropriating water in a reservoir for canoeing
and appropriating instream flows for the same purpose. Christine A. Klein, The Constitutional Mythology of Western Water Law, 14 VA. ENvTL. L.J., 343, 379 n.216 (1995). It is
that very concern that has motivated most western states to regulate the ownership
and/or purposes of instream flow rights. A reservoir can hold only a limited amount
of water (if its sole use is recreation, the only draft on the river after the initial fill will
be to replace seepage and evaporation), while an instream flow right could potentially
command the entire flow of a river every year.
13. See, e.g., New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 696; Denver, 656 P.2d at 1; In the Matter of the
Amended Application of the United States of America for Reserved Water Rights in
the Platte River in Boulder, Clear Creek, Douglas, El Paso, Gilpin, Jefferson, Larimer,
Park and Teller Counties, (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 1, Colo. 1993) (Nos. W-8439-76, W8977-77, W-9052-77, W-9064-77 and W-9065-77), [hereinafter Division 1 National Forests Case]. See also cases cited infra notes 34 and 55.
14.

See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS TASK FORCE CREATED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 389(D) (3) OF P.L. 104-127, PART III (Aug 25, 1997), [hereinafter Task Force
Report]; James S. Witwer, The Renewal of Authorizations to Divert Water on NationalForests,
24 COLO. LAw. 2363 (Oct. 1995).
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The doctrine of federal reserved water rights 15 is itself the subject
of many law review articles' 6 and is summarized in the leading cases."
Simply stated, when Congress or the President reserves lands for a specific purpose, ' 8 the courts will imply the intent to reserve appurtenant
unappropriated water "to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation."'9 Federal reserved rights "are not dependent
upon state law or state procedures,"' and cannot be frustrated by state
law.' However, because Congressional intent is implied rather than
expressed, and because of past Congressional deference to state water
law, reserved rights are subject to several important limitations:" the
reserved right is for only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the
primary purposes of the reservation, so that "without the water the
purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated." 3
The United States originally resisted attempts to compel it to assert
its reserved rights claims in Colorado water adjudications, arguing that
the McCarran Amendment did not apply to reserved water rights and
that the Colorado statutory scheme was not a general adjudication
within the meaning of the McCarran Act.2 5

The United States Su-

15. Also known as the Winters Doctrine because it originated in Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) - a controversy over water for the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation in which the Court found an implied intent to reserve water in order to
avoid great injustice to the tribe. The doctrine was originally thought to be peculiar to
Indian law, see FrankJ. Trelease, FederalReserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DENV. L.J.
473, 475 (1977), and was not applied to other federal reservations until Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
16. See, e.g., Alan E. Boles & C.M. Elliott, United States v. New Mexico and the Course of
Federal Reserved Water Rights, 51 U. COLO. L. REv. 209 (1980); Star L. Waring & Kirk S.
Samuelson, Non-Indian FederalReserved Water Rights, 58 DENV. L.J. 783 (1981); Hank
Meshorer, Federal Reserved Water Rights Litigation, 28 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1283
(1982) (for the personal perspective of a U. S. Department ofJustice attorney).
17. See, e.g., Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); United States v. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).
18. Unreserved federal lands, such as those administered as public domain by the
Bureau of Land Management under FLPMA, do not give rise to reserved rights. Sierra
Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
19. Cappaert,426 U.S. at 138. Of course, Congress can also expressly reserve water,
as was actually the case in Cappaert. See, e.g., Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1271 (1994 & Supp. 11995), discussed infra pp. 164-65.
20. Cappaert,426 U.S. at 145; see also United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631, 641 (Colo.
1986).
21. Bell, 724 P.2d at 644-45. For instance, a reserved right cannot be abandoned
for nonuse. Denver, 656 P.2d at 34. But, the federal government must comply with
such state procedural rules as filing deadlines, Bell, at 643-44, and rules governing
pleading, discovery, and the admissibility of evidence, United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1,
7 (1993). The result is a mix of state and federal law, in which state law is applied so
long as it does not "impinge[ ] on vital federal interests." Denver,656 P.2d at 20.
22. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 701-02 (1978).
23. Id. at 700 (footnote omitted).
24. United States v. Dist. Ct. for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 523 (1971).
25. United States v. Dist. Ct. for Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. 527, 529 (1971).
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preme Court disagreed 6 and, after one last unsuccessful attempt to adjudicate Indian claims in federal court,27 the United States resigned itself to asserting both its Indian and non-Indian reserved rights claims
in Colorado proceedings."' The first Colorado case to try the issue was
a consolidated proceeding for Colorado's Water Divisions 4, 5, and 69
(the Gunnison, Colorado, and Yampa river basins, respectively)." The
federal claims included reserved instream flow rights and reserved and
appropriative rights for out-of-stream uses (i.e., utilizing diversion
structures).S That proceeding ultimately culminated in United States v.
Denver,2 the leading Colorado reserved rights case.

26. See Eagle County, 401 U.S. at 523; Water Div. No. 5, 401 U.S. at 529.
27. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)
[hereinafter Akin, the name by which the case is commonly known in Colorado].
28. The long jurisdictional struggle over the adjudication of federal reserved rights
in the Colorado River basin in Colorado is summarized in Denver, 656 P.2d at 1. The
United States and various Indian tribes on occasion, and unsuccessfully, continued to
challenge the adequacy of other state fora. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,
463 U.S. 545 (1983);Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. U.S., 601 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979). But see United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.
1984).
29. In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the United States of America (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 4, Colo.) (Nos. W-425 through W-438); In the Matter of
the Application for Water Rights of the United States of America (Dist. Ct., Water Div.
No. 5, Colo.) (Nos. W-467 and W-69); and In the Matter of the Application for Water
Rights of the United States of America (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 6, Colo.) (Nos. W-85
and W-86) [hereinafter consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and 6].
30. Colorado has seven water divisions, each corresponding to one of the major
river basins. The others are: Division 1-the South Platte; Division 2-the Arkansas; Division 3-the Rio Grande; and Division 7-the San Juan. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-201
(1997).
31. The United States' claims in this and other proceedings included so-called instream flow water rights for such purposes as fire protection, wildlife and stock watering, and recreational use (for human consumption, rather than boating or fishing).
These are not really instream flow rights at all, but rights to divert water for out-ofstream uses without a permanent diversion structure, and have not encountered the
same opposition as true instream flow rights. See infra note 153.
32. United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982). Despite the fears of the
United States and others (see infra note 39) that the federal government's claims would
not get a fair hearing in state courts, the Denver decision was so well-reasoned and
even-handed that the federal government did not seek review in the United States
Supreme Court. The same was true of United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1986).
Similarly, a perhaps surprising number of water court decisions have not been appealed by either side - testimony to the fairness of the water judges across the state.
But see DAVID M. GILuLAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTON: SEEKING
ABALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE 181 (1997) for a contrary view of state courts generally. Although Gillilan and Brown (a Forest Service employee) recognize that methodological problems have plagued the federal government's technical cases, id. at 19193, they appear to blame state courts and objectors for requiring the government to
prove its case.
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NATIONAL FORESTS

While the consolidated case for Divisions 4, 5, and 6 was still making its way through the Colorado courts,3 the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of reserved instream flow rights for the national forests in United States v. New Mexico.34 In 1970, the New Mexico
State Engineer initiated a general adjudication for the Rio Mimbres.3
The Forest Service sought instream flow rights for aesthetic, environmental, recreational, and fish preservation purposes in Gila National37
Forest.3 6 The New Mexico Supreme Court denied the federal claims
and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.38
In New Mexico, the Court applied those principles of statutory construction discussed above to rein in the federal government's expansive claims. 3" The Court scrutinized the legislative history of the Organic Administration Act of 1897,40 which defined the purposes for
which national forests could be reserved, and concluded that Congress
reserved the national forests to serve only two primary purposes: to secure favorable conditions of water flow for settlers of the arid west, and
to furnish a continuous supply of timber; the forests were not reserved
for aesthetic, environmental, recreational, or wildlife preservation
purposes. 4' The Court noted pointedly that the additional purposes
claimed by the government would partially defeat Congress' primary

33. The history of the consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and 6 is traced in
United States v. Denver. Denver, 656 P.2d at 10-12. The United States' claims first went
to a master-referee, who held hearings over a period of approximately three years and
submitted a report and a proposed decree to the water court in 1976. Denver, 656 P.2d
at 11. Objections were then submitted to the water court, which, in 1979, adopted the
master referee's proposed decree with modifications and entered an order under
COLO. R. Civ. P. 54(b) allowing an immediate appeal, although some aspects of the
decree were not yet final. Id. at 11-12.
34. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978). The issue was also decided
by the Idaho state courts. In 1975, an Idaho district court adjudicated a reserved right
for the entire natural flow of three creeks in Caribou National Forest, but was reversed
by the Idaho Supreme Court on appeal. Avondale Irrigation Dist. v. North Idaho
Properties, Inc., 577 P.2d 9 (Idaho 1978). The case did not go any higher and New
Mexico became the leading case.
35. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 697.
36. Id. at 704.
37. Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564 P.2d 615 (N.M. 1977).
38. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 698.
39. One commentator, criticizing Akin, supra note 27, on the ground that state
courts would be likely to discriminate against federal claims, had argued that the New
Mexico Supreme Court had "misapplied the Cappaertstandard" and pointed to the decision as "demonstrat[ing] the danger state court adjudication poses to important federal policies." Robert H. Abrams, Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights and the Narrowing
Scope of FederalJurisdiction: The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1136, 1139
(1978). Rather than viewing New Mexico as vindicating the state courts, however, those
favoring a more expansive reserved rights doctrine criticized the decision as flawed
and argued for restricting its use as precedent. See GILULAN & BROWN, supra note 32,
at 188-90.
40. 16 U.S.C. § 473 (1994).
41. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707-08.
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goal of enhancing the quantity of water available to settlers.
The Court then considered the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act
of 1960 ("MUSYA") 43 and found that it established supplementary secondary purposes, for which Congress did not intend to reserve additional water, particularly since doing so would defeat one of the primary purposes of the forest. 4 The Court stated that where water was
only sought for a secondary purpose, the federal government was required to "acquire water in the same manner as any other public or
private appropriator. ' 45

The Court affirmed denial of the United

States' instream flow claims, stating, "Congress intended that water
would be reserved only where necessary to preserve the timber or to
secure
favorable water flows for private and public uses under state
, 46
law.
By the time the consolidated cases reached Colorado's highest
court, New Mexico had been decided. Undeterred, the federal government continued to press for instream flow reserved rights with a
1960 priority under MUSYA, arguing that the language to the contrary
in New Mexico was only dictum.47 The Colorado Supreme Court was
not persuaded; following the Supreme Court's lead in New Mexico, it
denied the government's claim and told it to "proceed under state
law
4
in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator. 8
After Denver, the State and other objectors, relying on stare decisis
and collateralestoppel, filed a motion for summary judgment on the Forest Service's instream flow claims in Water Division 2.49 The water
court granted the motion and the United States appealed. This time
the government argued that instream flows were needed for one of the
primary national forest purposes identified in New Mexico:1
[R]ecent advances in the science of "fluvial geomorphology" have
shown that strong, recurring instream water flows are necessary to

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 713.
42 U.S.C. § 528 (1994).
New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 714-15.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 718.
Denver, 656 P.2d at 24.

48. Id. at 27. Still undeterred, the United States asserted its MUSYA claim yet again
in Idaho's ongoing Snake River adjudication, and yet again the claim was denied. In re
SRBA, Case No. 39576, slip op. at 22 (D. Idaho Dec. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Idaho Order]. The United States is appealing the decision. United States v. City of Challis,
Case No. 24560 (Idaho filedJune 11, 1998).
49. United States v.Jesse, 744 P.2d 491, 498 (Colo. 1987).
50. Id. at 499.
51. Id. To some, this looked suspiciously like a post hocjustification for the claims,
hastily cobbled together to circumvent New Mexico and Denver. The Forest Service admitted that its shift in emphasis was "partially in response to . . . United States v. New
Mexico," but contended that it had not sought to quantify channel maintenance flows
earlier because it had assumed that fisheries maintenance flows would also accomplish
the channel maintenance purpose. Id. at 499 n.8.
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maintain efficient stream channels and to secure favorable conditions of
waterflows, and that diversions of water within the national forests by
private appropriators reduce stream flows and
threaten the equilib52
rium that preserves natural stream channels.

In United States v. Jesse,53 the Colorado Supreme Court reversed and
remanded to give the federal government the opportunity to prove
that "the purpose of the Organic Act will be entirely defeated unless
the United States is allowed to maintain minimum instream flows
over
54
the forest lands ....Otherwise, the claims should be denied.
After Jesse, the focus shifted to Water Division 1 where the Forest

Service and objectors geared up for what was generally viewed as the
next big test case.55 The Forest Service claimed instream flow rights for
channel maintenance at 241 quantification points on streams in the
national forests. 5 For each "QP," the claimed right included peak or

"bankfull" flows, rise and recession flows, and baseflows.5 ' The trial,
which began in January 1990, took more than a hundred days; in-

volved field visits, many technical witnesses, and over a thousand exhibits; and produced a six inch stack of post-trial briefs. 5 Ultimately,1
the Forest Service failed to prove two essential elements of its case:
first, that the claimed rights were necessary to secure favorable water
flows ° and, second, the minimum amount of water needed to ensure
that the purposes of the forests would not be entirely defeated.5
Moreover, the Forest Service's own experts were forced to admit the

52. Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
53. United States v.Jesse, 744 P.2d 491 (Colo. 1987).
54. Id. at 503. The Court specifically instructed:
For each federal claim of a reserved water right, the trier of fact must examine the documents reserving the land from the public domain and the Organic Act; determine the precise federal purposes to be served by such legislation; determine whether water is essential for the primary purposes of the
reservation; and finally determine the precise quantity of water necessary to
satisfy such purposes.
Id. at 503 n. 11.
55. The Forest Service had previously failed to prove the necessity of instream flows
for watershed protection or timber production for Toiyabe National Forest in Nevada.
United States v. Alpine Land and Reservoir Co., 503 F. Supp. 877 (D. Nev. 1980), af'd,
697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983). However, the evidence presented in support of the
claims in that case was "insignificant." Id. at 893. The Forest Service also claimed
channel maintenance flows for Organic Act purposes in the Big Horn River adjudication in Wyoming, but settled the case by agreeing to subordinate its rights to all existing and future water development projects, making the rights practically worthless.
GILuILAN & BROWN, supranote 32, at 190-91, and authorities cited therein.
56. Amended Application for Confirmation of Reserved Water Rights (Instream
Flows), Division 1 National Forests Case, supra note 13.
57. Id.
58. Trial court record, Division 1 National Forests Case, supra note 13.
59. See supra note 54.
60. Memorandum of Decision and Order at 23, 24, 32, Division 1 National Forests
Case, supra note 13.
61. Id. at 29-32.
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inadequacy of their methodology." The applications were denied.63
Contrary to the water court's expectation,' the United States did not
appeal.'
Although it vindicated the objectors' contention that the Forest6
Service's instream flow claims were a solution in search of a problem,
the Division 1 case also demonstrated how litigation can disappoint
expectations of getting a final answer to a recurring question. Despite
all the time and money spent on what was to be the test case, the legal
questions were not resolved and applications in Divisions 2, 3, and 7
remained outstanding.67 In addition, without abandoning its reserved
rights theory, the Forest Service began pursuing other strategies to obtain instream flows (i.e., regulatory requirements and applications for
appropriative rights). Due to both the fact-specific nature and, hence,
limited precedential value of the Division 1 decision and the subsequent conflicts over appropriative rights and permit conditions, the
parties to the Division 2, 3, and 7 cases have been trying to negotiate
settlements that will address all the national forest instream flow uses
in one package. To date, these negotiations have been frustratingly
unproductive. Meanwhile, the United States is preparing to try a re62. The Forest Service's experts were forced into that awkward position in order to
support an eleventh hour motion to amend the claims. Id. The water court denied
the motion on the ground that it would have been unfair to the objectors to trigger "a
new round of investigations.., and several more months of trial." Id. at 32.
63. Id.
64. "This court has come to the conclusion that the applicant has not shown the
claims for reserved water rights to be necessary, but is under no apprehension that its
word will be the final one on this question." Id.
65. The United States probably chose not to appeal because the decision was based
on the facts (and was well-supported by the record) and did not rule out the possibility of instream flow rights as a matter of law if the United States were to present a better case.
66. Certain Objectors Joint Opening Post-Trial Brief Regarding the Necessity and
Quantification of Channel Maintenance Flows at 109, Division 1 National Forest Case,
supra note 13. The Forest Service has also looked to instream flow rights to prevent
channel degradation, rather than addressing the problem's real causes - such activities as grazing, road building and maintenance, and the use of motorized recreational
vehicles. See Memorandum of Decision and Order at 19-20. Id.
67. See In the Matter of the Applications for Water Rights of the United States of
America in Water Division No. 2 (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 2, Colo. 1998) (Nos. 79-CW176, 81-CW-220, 81-CW-221, 81-CW-222, 81-CW-223, 82-CW-18, 82-CW-19, 82-CW-20,
82-CW-27, 82-CW-28, 82-CW-29, 82-CW-30, 82-CW-31, 82-CW-32, 82-CW-33, 82-CW-34);
Concerning the Application for Water Rights of the United States of America (Dist.
Ct., Water Div. No. 3, Colo. 1981) (No. 81-CW-183 (consolidated)); In the Matter of
the Application for Reserved and Appropriative Water Rights of the United States of
America in Archuleta, Hinsdale, La Plata, Mineral, and San Juan Counties (Dist. Ct.,
Water Div. No. 7, Colo. 1976) (No. W-1605-76-B); In the Matter of the Application for
Reserved Water Rights of the United States of America to Water on, in and under the
San Juan National Forest (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 7, Colo. 1973) (Nos. 1146-73, 114773, 1148-73).
68. Most recently, the parties to the Division 2 litigation agreed to a further extension of time, rather than breaking off negotiations, after the Forest Service repudiated
key settlement principles previously agreed to in writing. See Stipulation for Extension
of Time and Approval of Minimum Principles for Further Negotiations, In the Matter
of the Applications for Water Rights of the United States of America in Water Division
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vised version of its channel maintenance claims in Idaho's Snake River
adjudication.69
NATIONAL PARKS AND MONUMENTS

In the consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and 6, the
United States also asserted claims for reserved instream flow rights for
Dinosaur National Monument, Black Canyon of the Gunnison National Monument, and Rocky Mountain National Park.70 The water
court granted the federal government an instream flow right in the
Gunnison River for Black Canyon National Monument, and gave it five
years from the entry of a final decree to quantify the right.71 This claim
apparently drew little opposition as it is only mentioned in passing in
the appeal.7" A final decree for the Monument has not been entered,
and the right has yet to be quantified."
The Dinosaur National Monument claims were more controversial,
largely because of the monument's location "at the lowest reaches of
the Yampa River in Colorado. 74 A federal instream flow right would
have significantly affected many upstream junior rights and would
have caused Colorado to deliver more Yampa River water to Utah than
75
the minimum required by the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact.
The United States claimed instream flows for two purposes: recreational boating and the preservation of fish habitats of historic or scientific interest. The water court denied the recreational boating claim,
but held that an instream flow might exist to preserve fish habitats. 77 It
ordered further proceedings to determine whether the proclamation
creating the monument intended to reserve instream flows for fish
habitats of endangered species of historic and scientific interest and, if
so, to quantify the minimum amount of water necessary to fulfill that
78
purpose.

No. 2 (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 2, Colo. 1998) (Nos. 79-CW-176, 81-CW-220, 81-CW221, 81-CW-222, 81-CW-223, 82-CW-18, 82-CW-19, 82-CW-20, 82-CW-27, 82-CW-28, 82CW-29, 82-CW-30, 82-CW-31, 82-CW-32, 82-CW-33, 82-CW-34).
69. Trial is presently scheduled to begin in late 1998. Forest Service claims are also
pending in Utah, Nevada, Arizona, Oregon, and Montana. Telephone conversation
withJamesJ. DuBois, attorney, U.S. Dept. ofJustice (May 5, 1998).
70. Consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and 6, supra note 29.
71. Interlocutory Decree at 91-92, consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and
6, supra note 29.
72. United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 13 (Colo. 1982).
73. After the case was remanded, the United States never submitted, and the water
court never entered, a final decree on this portion of the case. Therefore, the five year
period still has not run. Quantification has been complicated by the parties' desire to
coordinate the right with the operation of the Aspinall storage project and reservoir
releases for the benefit of the Colorado River endangered fish species.
74. Denver, 656 P.2d at 27 n.44.
75. Id.
76. Consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and 6, supra note 29.
77. Interlocutory Decree at 442, 445-57, consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5,
and 6, supra note 29.
78. Id. at 448.
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The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the water court's conclusions: 9 the monument was indeed established for the purpose of
preserving objects of historic and scientific interest8 ° and the proclamation placing management under the National Park Service Act of
19168 did not enlarge the monument's purpose.82 The federal government was therefore not entitled to a reserved instream flow right
for recreational purposes.83 However, the Court remanded the case for
a determination of whether the purposes for which the monument was
reserved included preservation of fish habitats."
On remand, the Division 6 Water Court entered summary judgment denying the instream flow claim in its entirety on the ground
that the purpose of the proclamation was to preserve dinosaur remains, prehistoric archeological artifacts, and other objects of historic
and geologic interest, but not fish. The United States filed an appeal
from the water court's decision, but subsequently dismissed it.86
In Water Division 3, the United States claimed instream flow rights
for a number of creeks in the Great Sand Dunes National Monument.87
The claims were acceptable to the state and to the other objectors, all
of whom stipulated to a decree granting and quantifying the rights. 88
The federal government has had the easiest time with its national
park claims. This is hardly surprising since the "fundamental purpose"
of the National Park Service Act of 1916 is "to conserve the scenery
and the natural and historic objects and the wild life [sic] therein and
to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."8 9 As with Black Canyon National Monument, the water court
awarded instream flow rights for the west slope side of Rocky Mountain National Park, again apparently without controversy, and gave the
federal government five years from the entry of a final decree to quan79. Denver, 656 P.2d. at 27-29, 36.
80. Id. at 27 (citing to the Presidential Proclamation of Oct. 4, 1915, 39 Stat. 1752
(1915), based on the American Antiquities Preservation Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431).
81. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. I. 1995).
82. Denver, 656 P.2d at 28-30.
83. Id. at 29, 36.
84. Id.
85. Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, as modified, Order Clarifying
Order Dated March 14, 1985, Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and
Denying Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, In the Matter of the Application for
Water Rights of the United States of America in Dinosaur National Monument in Moffat County, Colorado (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 6, Colo. 1985) (No. W-85).
86. United States of America v. Wes Signs, et al, No. 85 SA 260 (Colo. April 17,

1986).

87. In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for Water
Rights in the Rio Grande River Drainage, in Alamosa and Saguache Counties (Dist.
Ct., Water Div. No. 3, Colo. 1981) (No. 81-CW-164).
88. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree, In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for Water Rights in the Rio Grande River Drainage, in Alamosa and Saguache Counties (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 3, Colo. 1981) (No.
81-CW-164).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. I. 1995).
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tify the rights."' The supreme court affirmed.9 ' A final decree still has
not been entered 92 and the parties are now in the process of negotiating quantities.
The United States subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment in Water Division 1, seeking water rights to all unappropriated
waters on the east slope of Rocky Mountain National Park. Despite
objections that the federal government had not shown that the entire
flow was needed, or that, given the park's headwaters location, a water
right was necessary to protect the flows, 94 the water court nonetheless
found that Congress intended to reserve all of the unappropriated water in the park to preserve its scenic beauty95 and granted the motion.96
This time it was the objectors who did not appeal.
The United States also claimed instream flow rights in the Mancos
River in Mesa Verde National Park, located in Water Division 7.7 The
primary purposes of Mesa Verde, the preservation of ruins and relics
and the protection of wildlife, are narrower than those of Rocky
Mountain National Park.98 Consequently, the United States, Colorado,
and local water users were able to reach a compromise that quantified
instream flow reserved rights in amounts acceptable to all the parties,
and the case was resolved by consent decree."
WILDERNESS AREAS

While it asserted reserved rights for a broad range of federal reservations, the federal government did not claim reserved rights for the

90. Interlocutory Decree at 268-70, consolidated proceeding for Division 4, 5, and
6, supra note 29.
91. The only issue that the court considered on appeal was the proper priority date
of the rights. Denver, 656 P.2d at 30, 36
92. See supra note 73.
93. Memorandum of Decision and Order at 1, Concerning the Application for Water Rights of the United States of America for Reserved Rights in Rocky Mountain National Park in Boulder and Laramie Counties (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 1, Colo. 1993)
(No. W-8439-76 (W-8788-77)), [hereinafter Division 1 RMNP Case].
94. Certain Objectors' Memorandum in Response to Applicant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Division 1 RMNP Case, supra note 93. The objectors argued that the
need for water does not necessarily equate with the need for a water right, when the
location of the reservation coupled with the Forest Service's regulatory authority adequately protect the water resource. Although the court found that argument persuasive in the Division 1 National Forests Case, Memorandum of Decision and Order at
11-12, Division 1 National Forests Case, supra note 13, the court simply ignored the argument in deciding the Division 1 RMNP Case.
95. Memorandum of Decision and Order at 8-9, Division 1 RMNP Case, supra note
93.
96. Id. at 11.
97. Concerning the Application of Water Rights for the United States of America
in the County of Montezuma (Reserved Water Rights for Mesa Verde National Park),
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree at 4 (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 7,
Colo. 1997) (No. W-1633-76).
98. Id. at 5.
99. Id. at 1-2, 8.
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twenty-four designated wilderness areas in Colorado.' ° In 1984, the
Sierra Club sued the Secretary of Agriculture and the Chief of the Forest Service, seeking both a declaratory judgment that wilderness reserved water rights exist and the federal defendants' failure to assert
the rights was unlawful and an order requiring that the defendants
take action to protect the rights.'0 ' The case had a long and convoluted history. and became a cause c ikbre,'0° as intervenors and amid
jumped in on both0 4sides to argue over the existence of wilderness reserved water rights.
The district court seemed positively eager to "explicitly hold and
05
enter final declaratory judgment" as to the existence of the rights,
but had more trouble with the remedy. Explaining that the separation
of powers doctrine prevented it from ordering the federal defendants
to instigate litigation to claim the rights, it instead ordered them to
reevaluate their alternatives and submit a written plan for fulfilling
their statutory duty to protect wilderness water resources.' 7 The federal defendants complied by filing a disrespectfully short report." After further wrangling,'0 the Forest Service submitted a longer, more
detailed report that found no present or foreseeable future threats to
the wilderness resources and outlined a number of options, including
the assertion of reserved rights, that the Forest Service could use to
protect wilderness water values should they be threatened in the future."0 The Sierra Club did not challenge the second plan and took

100. These wilderness areas were designated pursuant to the Wilderness Act of 1964,
16 U.S.C. § 1131 (1994 & Supp. I. 1995).
101. Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 846 (D. Colo. 1985).
102. Traced in Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1408-10 (10th Cir. 1990). During
the course of litigation, the Secretary of Agriculture changed three times, and the case
was successively captioned Sierra Club v. Block, Sierra Club v. Lyng, and Sierra Club v. Yeutter.
103. The lawsuit delayed new wilderness designation in Colorado until 1993. See
J.L. Weis, FederalReserved Water Rights in Wilderness Areas: A Progress Report on a Western
Water Fight, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 125 (1987), for a discussion of the political impasse as of the date of the article.
104. Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1407-08 n.97. The main issues were (and are): (1) are wilderness areas "reservations"?; (2) are wilderness purposes primary or (as with MUSYA)
secondary?; (3) what is the meaning of section 4(d)(7) of the Wilderness Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1133(6)(d), which states, "[n]othing in this chapter shall constitute an express or implied claim or denial on the part of the Federal Government as to exemption from State water laws."?
105. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 851.
106. Id. at 864.
107. Id. at 867.
108. The plan first submitted by the federal defendants was less than three pages
long "in its portentous... entirety." Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. 1490, 1495 (D.
Colo. 1987).
109. Judge Kane roundly excoriated the defendants and threatened them with sanctions. Id. at 1501-02.
110. Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1409-10. The Colorado wilderness areas are almost exclusively located at the headwaters of stream systems, so that there is little opportunity to
take water above them, and the construction of new diversion or storage facilities in
the wilderness areas themselves would require presidential approval. See M. Tristani,
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the position that "Judge Kane's ruling constitutes a declaratory judgment on all legal issues in this case and no additional relief is
sought.... The court then dismissed all claims
for relief "other than
' 2
the adjudicated claim for declaratory relief."
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the issues presented were
not ripe for adjudication because the harm sought to be alleviated was
remote and speculative"' and that the district court had erred in taking jurisdiction and declaring that the Wilderness Act creates federal
reserved water rights." 4 Thus, after six years of hard fought litigation,
Judge Kane's judgment that wilderness reserved rights exist was vacated."15 The question remained open until late 1997, when an Idaho
trial court entered an order granting the United States' motion for
summary judgment awarding instream flow rights for 7three wilderness
areas." 6 The State of Idaho is appealing the decision."
One healthy result of the wilderness water rights controversy is that
it has forced Congress to squarely address the water rights issue when
designating new wilderness areas, rather than remaining silent and
abdicating responsibility to the courts."8 The question is now likely to
be resolved on a case-by-case basis at the time an area is designated,
rather than by judicial fiat years, or even decades, after the fact. The
Colorado Wilderness Act of 1993,"" enacted after the smoke of litigation finally cleared, is a good example. The Act includes findings that
the headwater locations of these wilderness areas allow few, if any, opportunities for upstream water development; that the wilderness lands
themselves are not suitable for new or expanded water resource facilities; and that it is therefore possible to protect the wilderness values of
the lands in ways different from those used in other wilderness legislation. 20 The Act goes on to explicitly disclaim any intent to create reserved water rights.' 2' Other recent wilderness designations in western

Interior Turns Off Tap for Wilderness Areas, 29 NAT. RES. J. 877 (1989) ("Given that most
wilderness areas are located at the headwaters of streams, the question arises why Federal reserved water rights need to be asserted for wilderness areas at all."). Ms. Tristani
correctly concludes that the issue is more political than real.
111. Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1410, n.97 (quotingJudge Kane's characterization of the
Sierra Club's position).
112. Id. (again quotingJudge Kane).
113. Id. at 1419-21.
114. Id. at 1421.
115. Id.
116. Idaho Order, supra note 48.
117. In re SRBA, Case Nos. 24545, 24546, 24547, 24548, 24557, 24558, and 24559
(Idaho filed Feb. 24, 1998).
118. In the words of one commentator, "[Tihere is no justification for a prudent
government ever intentionally to rely on implications for the existence, quantity, priority, and nature of its right or rights enjoyed by its people." Charles Corker, A Real
Live Problem or Two for the Waning Energies of FrankJ Trelease, 54 DENVER L. J. 499, 503
(1977).
119. Pub. L. No. 103-77, 107 Stat. 756 (August 13, 1993).
120. Id. § 8.
121. Id.
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states have expressly reserved water rights,' but the touchiness of the
subject is reflected in the fact that most of the recent wilderness statutes include a statement that they are not intended to set a precedent
for future wilderness designations.'
OTHER RESERVED INSTREAM FLOW RIGHTS
In contrast to the 1964 Wilderness Act, the Wild and Scenic Rivers

12
Act' 24 contains an express reservation, albeit in negative terms: 1

(c) Reservation of waters for other purposes or in unnecessary quantities prohibited.
Designation of any stream or portion thereof as a national wild, scenic, or recreational river area shall not be construed as a reservation
of the waters of such streams for purposes other than those specified
in this chapter, or in quantities greater than necessary to accomplish
these purposes.
However, like the Wilderness Act, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act does

not resolve the question of how to handle new designations, which
might not be possible in the face of water user opposition to poten-

tially large instream flow rights. Colorado affords another example of
a negotiated compromise: the designation of the Cache la Poudre, "' a

tributary of the Platte River, located west of the city of Fort Collins.
Only the upper portion of the Cache la Poudre was designated 128 and
that with several express conditions. The first of these conditions allows downstream development, even if such development affects the

122. See, e.g., California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat.
4471 (Oct. 31, 1994); Arizona Desert Wilderness Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-628, 104
Stat. 4469 (Nov. 28, 1990); Nevada Wilderness Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101195, 103 Stat. 1784 (Dec. 5, 1989); Washington Park Wilderness Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-668, 102 Stat. 3961 (Nov. 16, 1988); El Malpais National and Conservation
Area, Pub L. No. 100-225, 101 Stat. 1539 (Dec. 31, 1987). The Arizona and California
acts also expressly disclaim any reserved rights to the water of the Colorado River for
the Havasu or Imperial Wilderness Areas, located in both states.
123. The Colorado, California, Arizona, Nevada, and New Mexico statutes, supra
notes 119 and 122, all contain such "no precedent" language.
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
125. The Idaho district court in the Snake River adjudication, supra note 48, recently
reached this same conclusion. Memorandum Decision Granting, in Part, and Denying, in Part, the United States' Motion for Summary Judgment on Reserved Water
Rights Claims (July 27, 1998).
126. 16 U.S.C. § 1284 (1994). The Idaho district court in the Snake River adjudication held that the United States was not entitled to all unappropriated flows as a matter of law, but was required to prove "the minimum quantity necessary to fulfill these
general purposes and such specific values as were attached by each designation."
Memorandum Decision Granting, in Part, and Denying, in Part, the United States'
Motion for SummaryJudgment on Reserved Water Rights Claims (July 27, 1998) at 11.
127. Pub. L. No. 99-590, 100 Stat. 3330 (Oct. 30, 1986).
128. The designated portions of the Cache la Poudre and South Fork of the Cache
la Poudre are further broken down into five segments, three of which are classified as
wild and two of which are classified as recreational. Id. §101 3(a)(56).
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designated portion.'2 The second provides that the reserved water
right established by the designation shall be adjudicated in Colorado
water courts and shall have a priority date as of the date of enactment.""
The issue of reserved water rights also arises in the context of national recreation areas and national conservation areas.' These may
include wilderness areas, rivers designated under the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act, or national monuments. 2 Sometimes the designating legislation specifically addresses the issue of water reservation. For example, the Acts designating the San Pedro Riparian National Conservation Area 33 and the El Malpais National Monument and Conservation
Area 34 contain express reservations of water, 3 5 while the Act designating the Hells Canyon National Recreation Area 3 6 states that neither
that Act nor the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act "shall in any way limit, restrict, or conflict with present and future use of the waters of the Snake
River and its tributaries" upstream from the area and that "[n]o flow
requirements of any kind may be imposed on the waters of the Snake
River" within the area.137
However, other Acts, like the one creating the Sawtooth National
Recreation Area, 38 state that "[n] othing in this subchapter shall constitute an express or implied claim or denial on the part of the Federal
Government as to exemption from State water laws.' 39 By taking the
easy way out, Congress leaves to the courts what should be a legislative
decision.4 0 Although such language has become less acceptable since
129. Id. § 102.
130. Id. As contemplated by the Act, the United States applied for a reserved water
right and the parties to the case stipulated to a decree. Revised Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree, Concerning the Application of the United States of America for Reserved Water Rights for the Cache La Poudre Wild and Scenic River in Larimer County (Rocky Mountain National Park and Roosevelt National Forest) (Dist.
Ct., Water Div. No. 1, Colo. 1986) (No. 86-CW-67).
131. See 16 U.S.C. § 460 (1994).
132. Id.
133. Arizona-Idaho Conservation Act of 1988, 16 U.S.C. § 460xx (1994 & Supp. I
1995).
134. 16 U.S.C. § 460uu (1994 & Supp. 11995).
135. Id. §§ 460xx-l(d) and 460uu-49(a) (1994).
136. Id. § 46 0gg (1994 & Supp. 11995).
137. Id. § 460gg-3(a) (b) (1994). An Idaho district court has construed the Hells
Canyon National Recreation Area Act to expressly reserve all unappropriated waters
originating in tributaries within the area boundaries. Idaho Order, supra note 48.
However, it seems more likely that the failure to include "and its tributaries" in subsection (b) was due to sloppy legislative drafting than that it expressed Congress' considered intent to reserve all tributary water within the area boundaries. The State of
Idaho is appealing the ruling. In re SRBA, Case Nos. 24545, 24546, 24547, 24548,
24557, 24558, and 24559 (Idaho filed Feb. 24, 1998).
138. 16 U.S.C. § 460aa (1994).
139. Id. § 460aa-8. See also Indian Peaks Wilderness Area, the Arapahoe National
Recreation Area and the Oregon Islands Wilderness Area Act, 16 U.S.C. § 460jj-4
(1994) (Arapahoe National Recreation Area).
140. The rationale for implied reserved rights is that, when a reservation of land
does not expressly address water, the court will review the creative act and legislative
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the wilderness controversy, it still occurs.141
APPROPRIATIVE INSTREAM FLOW RIGHTS
Under the doctrine of prior appropriation, adopted by most of the
western states, water rights are created by diverting water and placing it
to beneficial use. The doctrine developed in response to mining and
agricultural water needs 143 at a time when most instream uses were
barely a blip on anyone's radar screen.1 44 Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the doctrine, as originally conceived, did not recognize instream flow water rights which by their very nature do not involve a diversion. 45 The law of most western states has since evolved to integrate
instream flow rights into their prior appropriation systems. 146 Two
states, Arizona and Nevada, simply do not require a diversion as an
element of an appropriation.14 ' Thus, in Nevada, the Bureau of Land
Management was granted an appropriative right for recreation and
fishery purposes in a natural lake. 48 However, other states impose requirements that may impede a federal agency's appropriation of instate
stream flows. 1 49 For example, most states designate one or more
50

agencies as the only entities that can hold instream flow rights.
In Colorado, only the Colorado Water Conservation Board
("CWCB") may be granted a decree adjudicating an instream flow water right.' 5' The CWCB may appropriate the waters of natural streams
and lakes to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree

history for the particular reservation and determine what Congress would have done
had it considered whether to reserve water. Thus, language explicitly disclaiming any

intent presents a real conundrum for a court. There is a good argument that a court

should not imply an intent to reserve water when Congress deliberately shirks the is-

sue.
141. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 460iii-5(d) (1994) (Snake River Birds of Prey National Conservation Area).
142. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 458-59 (1922). See also GEORGE VRANESH,
1 COLORADO WATER LAW § 2.3, at 66-72 (1987), for a general discussion of the elements of an appropriation.
143. See e.g., VRANESH, supra note 142, § 2.3 at 60-64; WELLS A. HUTCHINS, 1 WATER
RIGHTS LAW IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, Misc. Pub.

No. 1206, at 157-71 (1971).
144. But see Empire Water and Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir.
1913), in which a Colorado resort town sought unsuccessfully to protect its scenic waterfalls, for an early case in which the prior appropriation system was inadequate to
protect instream flows.
145. See Covell, supra note 11, at 178.
146. Id. at 180-88.
147. Id. at 188-89. See also the discussion of recent changes in New Mexico's approach to instream flows. Id. at 190-91.
148. Nevada v. Morros, 104 Nev. 709, 766 P.2d 263 (1988).
149. Such state law requirements do not limit reserved rights, which are created by
federal law.
150. See Covell, supra note 11, at 180-88.
151. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1997).
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and may also acquire water and water rights for that purpose.'52 No
federal agency has ever been granted a decree for a new appropriative
right for instream flows under Colorado law,5 although, in the mid1980s, there were a few anomalous cases in which the Forest Service
and the National Park Service each purchased existing agricultural
water'54 rights and obtained decrees changing them to instream flow
uses.
However, although Colorado law does not allow the federal
government to appropriate instream flows, the Colorado instream flow
statute is tailored to encourage federal agencies' to rely on the CWCB
to protect instream flows for federal purposes. Prior to appropriating
or acquiring
instream flows,
the
CWCB must request
recommendations from the United States Department of Agriculture
and the United States Department of the Interior. Additionally, the
CWCB may acquire water or water rights from other governmental

152. Id.
153. In 1987, a Fish and Wildlife Service application for a new appropriative instream flow right on Vermillion Creek in the Browns Park National Wildlife Refuge
was denied by the water court based in part on the CWCB's exclusive authority. Ruling of Referee (confirmed by the water court Apr. 28, 1988), Concerning the Application of Water Rights of: the United States of America, in Moffat County (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 6, Colo. 1988) (No. 87-CW-135).
In the consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and 6, supra note 29, the master-referee awarded the Bureau of Land Management several hundred very small appropriative rights within natural streams for fire protection, livestock and wildlife watering, and recreation. Partial Master-Referee Report Regarding the Claims of the
United States of America (August 6, 1976) [hereinafter Report], consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5, and 6, supra note 29. The master-referee expressly found
that the rights would be diverted for use outside the course of the streams. Report at
508-09. "The manner of these diversions is immaterial, so long as they exist." Id. at 509
(emphasis added). He noted that the recreational uses were for drinking, cooking, or
the like, which required diversions, and that "[tio the extent such claimed recreational use requested the maintenance of flows for fish propagation, they must, of
course, be denied under the terms of Rocky Mountain Power.". Id. The water court
quoted the referee-master's report with approval. Findings, Conclusions and Order
of the Court with Reference to the Partial Master-Referee's Report Covering All of the
Claims of the United States of America and the Proposed Interlocutory Decree at 6061 (March 6th, 1978), consolidated proceeding for Divisions 4, 5,and 6, supra note 29.
The Colorado Supreme Court simply noted that the master-referee had ruled that the
United States' claim for appropriative rights was valid "notwithstanding the absence of
a permanent man-made diversion structure" and that there were no objections to his
ruling. United States v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 14-15 (Colo. 1982). In a subsequent dispute over whether Colorado law allows the federal government to appropriate instream flow rights, the Forest Service mischaracterized these as instream flow rights.
See, e.g., letter from Richard E. Rominger, Deputy Secretary, Dept. of Agriculture, to
Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, State of Colorado, (May 17, 1995); letter from
Elizabeth Estill, Regional Forester, to Senator Don Ament, Chair, Agriculture, Natural
Resources, and Energy Committee (May 8, 1995). It is clear from the record, -however,
that these rights are for out-of-stream uses, not instream flows.
154. See memorandum from Chuck Lile, Director, Colorado Water Conservation
Board, to U.S. Representative Entz, Chairman, House Committee on Agriculture,
Livestock and Natural Resources, and to U.S. Senator Ament, Chairman, Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Natural Resources and Energy (Subject: USFS and Instream Flow Protection) (April 25, 1995) [hereinafter Lile Memo].
155. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1997).
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entities and contract with them to specify how the CWCB will use the
water or water right.16 As a result of the law's paired prohibition and
invitation, the Bureau of Land Management and the Fish and Wildlife
Service have looked to the CWCB to secure instream flows. 57
NATIONAL FORESTS

In an obvious test case,5 in 1984, the Forest Service filed for a
small appropriative instream flow right on East Middle Creek, a tributary of Saguache Creek, located in the Rio Grande National Forest. 5 9
The claimed uses were fisheries, aesthetics, outdoor recreation, range
management, timber, watershed protection, and wildlife. 160 However,
the Forest Service press release gave only one purpose: "to protect
habitat for the Rio Grande Cutthroat Trout.' 6' The press release also

stated that the Forest Service "intend[ed] to work with the Colorado
Water Conservation Board to the fullest extent possible.' 62 Yet, despite the fact that the CWCB routinely appropriates instream flows to
protect trout fisheries, 63 the Forest Service did not request that the
The Forest
CWCB make an appropriation on East Middle Creek.'
Service initially justified its failure to go through the CWCB based on
the Service's "independent mandated requirements, priorities and resource needs that may not coincide with those of the Board."' 65 However, since the Forest Service's ostensible purpose was protecting trout
habitat, and since the CWCB can and does appropriate instream flows
for that purpose,'166 that justification was not terribly convincing. The

CWCB responded by filing a statement of opposition to the Forest
Service's application6 and then filing its own application for an instream flow right on East Middle Creek.'
156. Id.
157. Lile memo, supra note 154.
158. As was evidenced by the press release that followed the filing of the application.
Forest Service News, Rio Grande National Forest Public Affairs Office, Forest Service
Files for Water Right (Dec. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Press Release].
159. Application for Water Rights (Surface), Concerning the Application for Water
Rights of the United States of America in the Rio Grande River, in Saguache County
[hereinafter Division 3 National Forest Appropriative Rights Case] (Dist. Ct., Water
Div. No. 3, Colo. 1994) (No. 94-CW-39).
160. Id.
161. Press Release, supra note 158.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Development of Instream Flow Recommendations in Colorado Using R2Cross,
Colorado Water Conservation Board (Jan. 1996).
164. Lile memo, supra note 154.
165. Press Release, supra note 158.
166. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation
Board, 594 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1979); Development of Instream Flow Recommendations in Colorado, supra note 163.
167. Statement of Opposition (dated Feb. 28, 1995), Division 3 National Forest Appropriative Rights Case, supranote 159. Other users also opposed the application.
168. Application for Water Rights to Protect the Natural Environment to a Reasonable Degree, In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the Colorado Water
Conservation Board on Behalf of the People of the State of Colorado in East Middle
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After the inevitable public debate and politicking,' 69 the Forest
Service, the CWCB, and other parties agreed to stay both cases and
negotiate.'
Since then, the cases have been inactive while the parties
have worked on a comprehensive Division 3 settlement intended to resolve all of the Forest Service's reserved and appropriative rights
claims, as well as to prevent future regulatory restrictions on forest
permittees.
Before the dust had settled in Division 3, the Forest Service was
back, requesting that the CWCB apply for an instream flow right for
the East Fork of Dead Horse Creek, located in the White River National Forest, for recreation, aesthetics, fish, and wildlife purposes.17 '
The creek is the source of water for Hanging Lake and Bridal Veil
Falls, popular scenic attractions in Glenwood Canyon.'72 The Forest
Service requested that the CWCB appropriate the entire unappropriated flow of the creek, stating that "[a] nything less would diminish the
aesthetic qualities of these features . . . . ,,1'3The requested instream
flows were not to protect fisheries, the CWCB's usual standard for
quantifying
its claims, but to protect a unique environment and ecosys74
tem.

Although the request was an unusual one for the CWCB to consider, the CWCB and Forest Service staffs cooperated on the technical
documentation 75 and the CWCB applied for all unappropriated flows
in Dead Horse Creek17 and its east and west 7 forks and for the en-

Creek, a Natural Strfam in the Watershed of the Closed Basin in Saguache County,
Colorado (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 3, Colo. 1995) (No. 95-CW-34) [hereinafter Division 3 CWCB Case].
169. Federal-state water law conflicts invariably generate a good deal of political
heat, not to mention law review articles. In this case, there were exchanges of letters
between public officials (e.g., letter from U.S. Senator Hank Brown to Richard E.
Rominger, Acting Secretary of Agriculture (March 23, 1995); letter from Gale Norton,
Colorado Attorney General, to Richard E. Rominger, Acting Secretary of Agriculture,
re: Forest Service water right application (Feb. 16, 1995); Rominger and Estill letters,
supra note 153) and the Colorado General Assembly passed Senate Joint Resolution
95-15, requesting that the Forest Service withdraw its filing and seek an appropriative
right through the CWCB in accordance with state law.
170. See Order to Stay All Proceedings, Division 3 National Forest Appropriative
Rights Case, supra note 159.
171. Letter from Elizabeth Estill, Regional Forester, U.S. Forest Service, to Chuck
Lile, Director, Colorado Water Conservation Board (April 25, 1995).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. David Frey, Safeguardsfor HangingLake Run Deep, GLENWOOD PoST, Dec. 3, 1996,
at 1.
175. Memorandum from Dan Merriman, Colorado Water Conservation Board staff
member, to Colorado Water Conservation Board Members (Nov. 18, 1996) (Subject:
Agenda Item 20a, November 25-26, 1996, Board Meeting - Instream Flow Program Final Notice Water Division 5, Garfield County, with attachments).
176. Application for Water Rights to Protect the Natural Environment to a Reasonable Degree, In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the Colorado Water
Conservation Bd., in Dead Horse Creek, Garfield County, (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 5,
Colo. 1996) (No. 96-CW-350).
177. Application for Water Rights to Protect the Natural Environment to a Reason-
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tire volume of Hanging Lake." However, the Forest Service did not
abandon its efforts to acquire an instream flow right. Expressing concern that the CWCB might not adequately protect the rights, it sought
to become a co-applicant or to hold some other property interest in
the rights."' To avoid inconsistency with state law, the CWCB instead
offered to execute an enforcement agreement with the Forest Service
to ensure future protection of the rights.' The CWCB and the Forest
Service never came to terms on an enforcement agreement, but decrees for the four CWCB rights were signed by the water judge on May
7, 1997.12
NON-RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
No discussion of federal water rights would be complete without
mention of the theory of non-reserved water rights. The theory origi8 3 and, over an approximately three
nated in a 1979 solicitor's opinion1
year period, generated two more solicitor's opinions,' an opinion
from the Department of Justice, 8 5 and a flurry of law review articles, 86
but never resulted in a single water right filing.8

7

The 1979 Krulitz

able Degree, In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the Colorado Water
Conservation Board, in East Fork Dead Horse Creek, Garfield County (Dist. Ct., Water
Div. No. 5, Colo. 1996) (No. 96-CW-351).
178. Application for Water Rights to Protect the Natural Environment to a Reasonable Degree, In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the Colorado Water
Conservation Board, in West Fork Dead Horse Creek, Garfield County (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 5, Colo. 1996) (No. 96-CW-352).
179. Application for Water Rights to Protect the Natural Environment to a Reasonable Degree, In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of the Colorado Water
Conservation Board, in Hanging Lake, Garfield County (Dist. Ct., Water Div. No. 5,
Colo. 1996) (No. 96-CW-353).
180. See Letter from James S. Lochhead, Executive Director, Department of Natural
Resources, to Elizabeth Estill, Regional Forester, U.S. Forest Service (Feb. 11, 1997).
181. Id.
182. Findings and Ruling of Referee and Decree, Applications, supranotes 176-79.
183. Solicitor's Opinion No. M-36914, 86 Interior Dec. 553 (1979) [hereinafter
Krulitz Opinion].
184. Supplement to Solicitor's Opinion No. M-36914, 88 Interior Dec. 253 (1981)
[hereinafter Martz Opinion]; Second Supplement to Solicitor's Opinion No. M-36914,
88 Interior Dec. 1055 (1981) [hereinafter Coldiron Opinion].
185. Memorandum from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, to Carol E. Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division (June 16, 1982) [hereinafter Dinkins Memorandum] (generally referred to as the 'Dinkins Memorandum', although written by Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel).
186. See, e.g., Gary K King, Case Note, Federal Non-Reserved Water Rights: Fact or Fiction?, 22 NAT. RES.J. 423 (1982); Barry C. Vaughan, Comment, FederalNonreserved Water
Rights, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 758 (1981); David D. Freudenthal, Comment, FederalNonReserved Water Rights, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 67 (1980); Bruce A. Machmeier, Note,
FederalAcquisition of Non-Reserved Water Rights After New Mexico, 31 STAN. L. REv. 885
(1979).
187. In Denver, the court specifically noted that the United States had not advanced
any claims based upon he theory of federal non-reserved water rights. United States
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Opinion created a sensation'88 by asserting that, absent an express
Congressional prohibition, a federal agency could claim appropriative
rights necessary to serve any Congressionally authorized land management function, without regard to state substantive or procedural
law.'9 The opinion explicitly stated, "the appropriation for authorized
federal purposes cannot be strictly limited by what state water law says
is a 'diversion' of water to a 'beneficial use' for which water can be appropriated."' 90
The Martz Opinion narrowed the Krulitz Opinion by finding that
neither the Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA") T'
nor the Taylor Grazing Act' 9 authorized the Department of the Interior to a9p ropriate water in a manner inconsistent with state substantive law.
The subsequent Coldiron Opinion completely reversed
course, concluding that "there is no federal 'non-reserved' water
right"'194 and that, absent a reserved right, "consistent with the express
language in the New Mexico decision, federal entities must acquire water as would any other private claimant within the various states." 95
The 1982 Dinkins Memorandum had the last, and perhaps bestreasoned, word. Rather than treating the question as one unique to water law, the opinion relied on general principles of federal preemption. The Dinkins Memorandum concluded that there is a presumption that the western states retain control over the allocation of water
within their borders and that "the federal constitutional authority to
preempt state water law must be clearly and specifically exercised, either expressly or by necessary implication."' 96 The Supreme Court's
1993 statement in United States v. Idaho97 that "the McCarran Amendment submits the United States generally to state adjective law, as well
as to state substantive law of water rights"' further undercut the nonreserved rights theory and, to date, no federal agency has pressed a
preemption claim.

v. Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 11 n.20 (Colo. 1982). To date, the Division 3 National Forest
Appropriative Rights Case is probably as close as the United States has come to claiming anything resembling a non-reserved right, at least in Colorado.
188. Some indication of state reactions can be gleaned from the Dinkins Memorandum, supra note 185, at 2 n.1.

189. Krulitz Opinion, supra note 183.
190. Id. at 575.
191. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994 &Supp. 11995).
192. 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1994).
193. Martz Opinion, supra note 184, at 257-58.
194. Coldiron Opinion, supra note 184, at 1064.
195. Id. at 1065.
196. Dinkins Memorandum, supra note 185, at 79.
197. United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1 (1993).
198. Id. at 8. The statement occurs in the context of a holding that language in the
McCarran Amendment expressly providing "that no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States" precluded the State of Idaho from assessing large fees
against the federal government. Id
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THE BYPASS FLOW END RUN
The Division 1 National Forests Case opinion contained a discussion of the Forest Service's ability to use its permitting authority to
2°°
control harmful diversions.'" That discussion, taken out of context,
came back to haunt water users in the subsequent controversy over
permits for existing water supply facilities. Soon after its loss in Division 1, the Forest Service tried a new tack: when special use permits for
existing water supply facilities located in national forests in Division 1
came up for renewal under FLPMA,20 ' the Forest Service began demanding that the owners bypass a certain amount of their yields to
provide instream flows. 2 2 The ensuing controversy, 20°which included
the Secretary of Agriculture's issuance of a policy in 1992 that new bypass flows would not be imposed on existing facilities (the Madigan
Letter)204 and his successor's subsequent silent withdrawal of the policy
in 1994,205 led to the creation of a federal task force to study the is206
sue.
The use of permit conditions in lieu of water rights to secure instream flows raises questions about the interpretation of federal land

199. Memorandum of Decision and Order at 9-15, Division 1 National Forests Case,
supranote 13.
200. What is often overlooked is that the Forest Service had conceded that the
stream channels had adjusted to existing diversions. See, e.g., id. at 12-13. Most tellingly, the federal government was willing to subordinate its claims to all existing uses.
There were forty-six such subordinations, thirty-five of which were introduced as exhibits. Division 1 National Forests Case, supra note 13 (U.S. Exs. A-1458, A-1459, A1462-65, A-1467, A-1471, A-1472, A-1477, A-1478, A-1487, A-1493, A-1496-1501, A-152124, A-1528, A-1538, A-1539, A-1559, A-1568-72, A-1574, A-1599, and A-1600). Thus, the
court's allusion to permitting authority only pertained to new diversions. B. Raley,
Chaos in the Making: The Consequences of Failureto IntegrateFederalEnvironmental Statutes
with McCarranAmendment Water Adjudications, 41 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 24-1 at 2445 (1995). See also D. McConkey, FederalReserved Rights to Instream Flows in the National
Forests, 13 VA. ENvrL. L.J. 305, 321 (1994) (disagreeing with the court's reliance on the
Forest Service's permit authority in part because it would not affect existing rights, but
would apply only to new appropriations).
201. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
202. See Witwer, supra 14; Raley, supra note 200. Conflicts between federal agency
permits and state water law were nothing new. See, e.g., California v. FERC, 495 U.S.
490 (1990) (the Rock Creek Case); D. Craig Bell & Norman K. Johnson, State Water
Laws and Federal Water Uses: The Histoiy of Conflict, the Prospects for Accommodation, 21
ENvrL. L. 1, 30-37 (1990). But the Forest Service's use of its regulatory authority as a
substitute for a water right put a new spin on the conflict.
203. Well documented in Witwer, supra note 14; Raley, supra note 200. GILWnAN &
BROWN, supra note 32, at 208-12 give a detailed account of the political maneuvering
from another perspective. Although presenting both sides of the controversy, they
appear to take the Forest Service position at face value (e.g., Forest Service opponents
"accused," while Forest Service officials "repeatedly explained" or "pointed out").
204. Letter from Edward Madigan, Secretary of Agriculture, to U.S. Senator Hank
Brown (Oct. 6, 1992); see Witwer, supra note 14.
205. In an unusual maneuver, the Forest Service did not disclose that the Madigan
letter had been withdrawn for more than a year, Witwer, supra note 14, at 2364, so that
the Madigan Letter's demise was analogous to a tree falling in the forest where no one
hears it.
206. See Task Force Report, supra note 14.
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use statutes and the McCarran Amendment, 27 as well as about possible
0 ' Moreover, requiring bypass
takings of pre-FLPMA vested rights."
flows directly contravenes one of the two primary purposes of the national forests - securing favorable flow conditions for water users in order to further secondary purposes. It also frustrates the reasonable expectations of water users, often municipalities or other public
entities, who located their facilities on national forest lands years ago
at the invitation of the federal government.
The task force concluded that the Forest Service had not been
delegated the legal authority to impose bypass flows as a condition on
the grant or renewal of land use authorizations for existing water facilities on national forests and that it should utilize other means to
achieve the secondary purposes of the forests."' However, by the time
the report came out, the Forest Service and its permittees had largely
resolved their initial dispute through a joint operations plan whereby
those permittees with reservoirs located in the Cache la Poudre River
basin agreed to coordinate the operation of their reservoirs
to provide
•. 210
instream flows while still preserving their water supplies.
In the course of permitting, another issue emerged. When the
Madigan Letter undercut Forest Service authority to require bypass
flows, the Forest Service remembered its duty to consult with the U. S.
Fish and Wildlife Service under Section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act2 " to determine whether renewal of the permits would jeopardize
the continued existence of listed species or would adversely modify
such species' critical habitat. 21 2 The answer came back "yes"; the Fish
and Wildlife Service issued biological opinions finding that reissuing
the special use permits to allow the continuation of historic depletions
would jeopardize the continued existence of the whooping crane, least
tern, piping plover, and pallid sturgeon and adversely modify the
whooping crane's critical habitat (all located on the mainstem of the
207. Raley, supra note 200.
208. Witwer, supra note 14. A ditch and reservoir company on Colorado's west slope
successfully challenged a Forest Service special use permit requiring the release of bypass flows by showing that it actually had a pre-FLPMA easement for its facilities.
Overland Ditch and Reservoir Co. v. United States, No. 96 N 797 (D. Colo. Dec. 16,
1996).
209. Task Force Report, supra note 14, at Part VII, 1-6. A minority of the Task Force
disagreed with the conclusion that the Forest Service lacked legal authority to exact
bypass flows, but concurred in recommending that the Forest Service rely on other
means whenever possible. Id. at Part IX, 1-10.
210. Id. at Part VIII, 1-6. Ironically, it was an environmental organization, Trout Unlimited, that challenged one of the permits, issued for Long Draw Reservoir, because it
did not require bypass flows. Trout Unlimited v. United States Dep't of Agric., No. 95
CV 1075 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 8, 1995). The case was filed in the D.C. district court and
then transferred to the Colorado district court, No. 96-WY-2868-WD (D. Colo.). The
Task Force Report, supra note 14, was filed with the court in May 1997, and the case
has since languished.
211. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1994 & Supp. 11995).
212. For a fuller discussion of ESA permitting issues, see Deborah L. Freeman &
Carmen M. Sower, Against the Flow: Emerging Conflicts Between Endangered Species Protection and Water Use, 40 ROCKY MTN. MIN. LAw INST. 23-1 (1994).
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Platte River, more than 300 miles downstream in Nebraska) 25 The
Fish and Wildlife Service proposed two reasonable and prudent alternatives that would allow the Forest Service to issue the permits: the
permittees could either (1) deliver water at the Colorado-Nebraska
state line to replace their depletions; or (2) pay money to buy habitat
and water to benefit the species and participate in a yet-to-be developed basinwide recovery program.2 4 The facility owners opted to accept the second alternative and not challenge the opinions.
THE PROSPECTS FOR COMPROMISE
Litigating federal-state water disputes is costly, and the outcomes
are uncertain and often inconclusive. For example, one might have
thought that New Mexico would put an end to the Forest Service's quest
for reserved instream flow water rights; yet that quest is still going
strong after twenty years. As a result, there has been a trend towards
trying to resolve these disputes through negotiation and compromise.
The United States, Colorado, and water users are trying to address all
present and future national forest instream flow uses in Water Divisions 2, 3, and 7 through comprehensive settlements. The CWCB and
the Forest Service cooperated on the Hanging Lake filings to preserve
a unique natural environment located on federal lands. Additionally,
in both the Colorado and Platte River basins, the federal government,
states, water users, and environmental groups have implemented or
are in the process of developing recovery programs that are intended
to recover endangered species consistent with state laws and interstate
compacts and decrees.
Even so, the prognosis for negotiated solutions is uncertain. Negotiations in Divisions 2, 3, and 7, which had been moving slowly in any
event, suffered a serious setback when the United States repudiated
key principles of settlement to which it had previously agreed.2 7 It remains to be seen whether the Forest Service will be satisfied with instream flow rights held by the CWCB, or will renew its efforts to secure
213.

See, e.g., FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S.

DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL

BIOLOGICAL OPINION TO AcCOMPANY THE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR

LAND USE AuTHORIZATION FOR: JOE WRIGHT RESERVOIR (1994) [hereinafterJOE WRIGHT
FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION]; Witwer, supra note 14. The Fish and Wildlife Service had
previously taken a similar position in the Colorado River basin based on the preservation of four endangered fish species.
214. See, e.g., FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DRAFF
BIOLOGICAL OPINION FORJOE WRIGHT RESERVOIR (1993); JOE WRIGHT FINAL BIOLOGICAL
OPINION, supra note 213; Witwer, supra note 14.
215. See, e.g., JOE WRIGHT FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 213; Witwer, supra
note 14.
216. See FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF ThE INTERIOR, FINAL RECOvERY
IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAM FOR ENDANGERED FISH SPECIES IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER

BASIN (1987); COOPERATIvE AGREEMENT FOR PLATTE RIVER RESEARCH & OTHER EFFECTS
RELATING TO ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITATS ALONG THE CENTRAL PLATITE RIVER,

NEBRASKA (July 1997).

217. See supra note 68.
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independent appropriative rights. The Colorado River recovery program, which is premised on providing water under state law, is in a
state of flux"8 and the Platte River recovery program is still undergoing
review pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, 9 although
the participants are proceeding under the cooperative agreement
signed last July. 220

One of the biggest obstacles to these efforts has

been the federal government's tendency to view instream flows as the
panacea for environmental ills. 22 1 If the federal government is willing

to look first to non-flow options, if it is willing to recognize that stateowned water rights can meet its needs, and if state agencies and water
users are willing to meet federal agencies halfway when water truly is
needed, federal instream flow needs can be met within the framework
of state law.
Twenty-six years ago Charles Corker commented, "[i]f every
speaker who has talked in the last twenty years or so about federalstate relations in water law were laid end to end, it would be a good
and merciful thing., 2 2 The alternative to compromise is to continue
down the well worn path of confrontation and litigation, thereby
ensuring that there will be many more speakers to be laid, purely
hypothetically, end to end.

218. The recovery program contemplated a number of CWCB instream flow rights
on the Colorado, Yampa, Green, Little Snake, Gunnison, and White Rivers. Eric
Kuhn, General Manager of the Colorado River Water Conservation District and CWCB
member, has described these rights as "the result of a shotgun marriage" between the
ESA and state water law. Hot topics in NaturalResources Luncheon ProgramSeries (Apr. 29,
1998), UPPER COLORADO RIVER FISH RECOVERY PROGRAM. The bride and groom are not
yet at the altar, however, and the role, if any, that CWCB instream flow rights will play
in the recovery program is still an open question. Two rights on the Colorado River
have been decreed and four more applications on the Colorado and Yampa Rivers are
pending, but have been so controversial that the CWCB is presently considering withdrawing some or all of them. See Heather McGregor, Groups give up fight over claims on
flows of river, GRANDJUNCTION DAILY SENTINEL, May 7, 1998, at 1.
219. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994 & Supp. I 1995).
220. See supra note 216.
221. For instance, the Forest Service focused on instream flows to prevent channel
degradation, while ignoring more immediate land management problems. Supra note
66. Similarly, the Fish and Wildlife Service has emphasized the need for instream
flows to recover the Colorado River endangered fish, while other experts believe that
predation and competition by non-native fish and physical barriers in the rivers may
be the primary factors limiting recovery. HAROLD M. TVUS & JAMES F. SAUNDERS III,
COOPERATIVE INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF
COLORADO AT BOULDER, DRAFT- WORKPLAN OVERVIEW, RECOVERY NEEDS FOR ENDANGERED
FISHES IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER (1998). A notable exception is the Forest Serv-

ice's recognition that it can protect the water resources of upstream wilderness areas
without water rights.
222. Charles E. Corker, Federal-StateRelations in Water Rights Adjudication and Administration, 17 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 579, 579 (1972).

